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Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies
Abstract
Persian is an important language today in a number of countries of west, south and central Asia. But its
status in each is different. In Iran its unique status as the only official or national language continues to be
jealously guarded, even though half—probably more—of the population use a different language (mainly
Azari/Azeri Turkish) at home, and on the streets, though not in formal public situations, and not in writing.
Attempts to broach this exclusive status of Persian in Iran have increased in recent decades, but are still
relatively minor. Persian (called tajiki) is also the official language of Tajikistan, but here it shares that
status informally with Russian, while in the west of the country Uzbek is also widely used and in the more
isolated eastern part of the country other local Iranian languages are now dominant. In Afghanistan,
although Persian (officially renamed dari in 1964, but still commonly called farsi) is the official language,
the national language is Pashto, and there is no official restriction on the use of other languages (see
discussion by Nawid in this volume). Persian also continues to be spoken in some of the northern and
western parts of Pakistan and the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, for most people in
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, for reasons that are explained later, Persian is informally recognized as a
classical language. In the other countries of the region—Turkey, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the
other Central Asian republics—somewhat negative, discriminatory attitudes are found with regard to
Persian. This situation is a consequence of the nationalisms that have emerged over the past fifty years
or so. This unusual combination of vast geographical distribution and country-by-country variation can be
explained only by detailed reference to the history of the language. Persian makes an interesting historical
case study, because it includes in a somewhat exaggerated form a number of features that are found in
other modern languages that have long textual records—features which throw a shadow of the continuing
development of language policies in all these countries, and may illuminate some of the less tangible
factors behind language policy in general.
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Chapter 4:
PERSIAN, FARSI, DARI, TAJIKI
Language Names and Language Policies
by
Brian Spooner
Persian is an important language today in a number of countries of west, south and
central Asia. But its status in each is different. In Iran its unique status as the only official or
national language continues to be jealously guarded, even though half—probably more—of the
population use a different language (mainly Azari/Azeri Turkish) at home, and on the streets,
though not in formal public situations, and not in writing. Attempts to broach this exclusive
status of Persian in Iran have increased in recent decades, but are still relatively minor. Persian
(called tajiki) is also the official language of Tajikistan, but here it shares that status informally
with Russian, while in the west of the country Uzbek is also widely used and in the more isolated
eastern part of the country other local Iranian languages are now dominant. In Afghanistan,
although Persian (officially renamed dari in 1964, but still commonly called farsi) is the official
language, the national language is Pashto, and there is no official restriction on the use of other
languages (see discussion by Nawid in this volume). Persian also continues to be spoken in some
of the northern and western parts of Pakistan and the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, for most people in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, for reasons that are explained
later, Persian is informally recognized as a classical language. In the other countries of the
region—Turkey, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the other Central Asian republics—
somewhat negative, discriminatory attitudes are found with regard to Persian. This situation is a
consequence of the nationalisms that have emerged over the past fifty years or so. This unusual
combination of vast geographical distribution and country-by-country variation can be explained
only by detailed reference to the history of the language. Persian makes an interesting historical
case study, because it includes in a somewhat exaggerated form a number of features that are
found in other modern languages that have long textual records—features which throw a shadow
of the continuing development of language policies in all these countries, and may illuminate
some of the less tangible factors behind language policy in general.
Persian is an unusual, perhaps unique, case in world history: unlike other languages
which become media of written communication before the modern period, it moved seamlessly
out of its mediaeval past into the status of official language in three modern countries without
undergoing any significant modification. New Persian, the form of the language which emerged
in the Arabic script in the 8th century AD (with a borrowed Arabic vocabulary component
comparable to the Latin in English) is the direct successor to Middle Persian (written in a form of
the Aramaic script since the third century BC) and Old Persian before that (written in cuneiform

since the 6th century BC). Besides the longevity and relative stability of New Persian over a
period exceeding a millennium (for more detail see Spooner and Hanaway in press) from earlier
periods of very low literacy rates to present situations of near universal literacy, and from
language of dynastic courts and administration to national language—texts from the 9th and 10th
centuries are fully legible and still in use among educated Iranians today—this historical
continuity was facilitated by a number of factors. The most important are:
(a) the geographical extent of its standard usage between the 9th and the 19th centuries, from as
far east as the trade routes into central China under the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in the 13th
century, south over the Deccan Plateau into southern India under the Mughals, and as far west as
the western reaches of the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia, as the public language for any function
associated with writing—administration, trade, literature—regardless of local spoken languages,
among non-Muslims (e.g. Hindus) as well as Muslims,
(b) its association with the authority of governments and the culture (adab) of the secular elites
of cities throughout this vast area,
(c) the social organization of literacy (over an area much larger than the group of modern
countries considered in this volume), which effectively restricted entry to the literate class down
to the middle of the 20th century, the consistent degree of interaction among members of the
urban literate class throughout this area by travel and correspondence, and the high cultural and
religious value ascribed throughout the population (non-literate as well as literate) down to the
present day to the corpus of poetry written in Persian over the past millennium.
(d) the boost of foreign (Western) interest in the cultural heritage for which it was the vehicle,
inspired by European classical education and Orientalism from the Elizabethan period on;
(e) the practice of colonial administration in India down to 1837.
In this chapter I explore how these factors combined in the 19th-20th centuries to shape modern
attitudes towards standard Persian over this vast area, attitudes which more recently have begun
to unravel as a consequence of the emergence of vernacular nationalisms.
The English name “Persian" is from the name that has been in Western vocabulary since
Herodotus (c. 484 - 425 BC). It comes from Pars, the area around Persepolis (the Greek name
we use for the summer capital of the Achaemenian Empire) on the southwestern edge of the
Iranian Plateau. When the Persians began to convert to Islam after the Arab conquest in the
middle of the 7th century, the language was naturally influenced by the language of the Qur'an.
Eventually, Arabic settled into a role comparable to that of Latin in mediaeval Europe. When the
name of the area around Persepolis shifted from pars to fars (Arabic had no /p/), the name of the
language spoken there shifted similarly to farsi. Since Persian was the language of administration
of western Asia under the pre-Islamic Iranian empires, and it was the language of the secretarial
class, it continued to be used by non-Arabic speakers in the Islamic civilization that succeeded
them, and consequently spread over a much larger area—eventually at its peak in the 14th
century as far west as the Ottoman territories of what is now Bosnia, east into the Tarim Basin
around the Takla Makan and down the major trade routes into central China, and south into the

Muslim Sultanates of north and south India, where it remained the language of administration,
literature and polite society under the Mughals, and later the British, into the 19th century.
Through this period the social grasp of the writing class in the cities, and the popular appeal of
the literature they produced, provided a keel that steadied the historical trajectory of the written
language and a magnet that not only held together the far-flung writing community but also
standardized the speech of polite society. Eventually, however, a process of vernacularization
emerged and this Persianate unity and stability began to disintegrate. The process began first in
the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries, as the language of administration in the west
shifted gradually to a highly Persianized “Ottoman” Turkish. In India it was facilitated by the
British decision in 1835 to switch from Persian to a partnership of English with Urdu (a creole of
Persian superimposed on an Indic grammar). It accelerated in the 20th century with the steady
rise of literacy encouraged by nationalism, similar to the earlier shift from Latin to the
vernaculars in Western Christendom. Over the past 50 years Persian, however, written as well as
spoken, has probably changed as much or more than in the preceding 500 years, and there is now
noticeable divergence in usage between Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. But Persian continues
to be highly influential as a written language throughout the area. Thanks largely to the
continuing popularity of “classical” poetry from before the era of modern nation-states the
process of disintegration has been very gradual and is by no means complete.
I first heard “farsi” in an English sentence in the early 1970s. It gradually became
common, first outside academia, then inside. Before about 1970 the Persian language was of
little interest outside academia, but since about 1980 we have become dependent on nonacademic interest in the language for justification that is now necessary to pursue it in academia.1
Although the change is not difficult to explain, it tends to create divisions, even discrimination,
where none existed previously. For this, and perhaps other more sentimental, even romantic,
reasons, the International Society for Iranian Studies and some other academic bodies have taken
a formal position against the use of farsi in English.
Why should the change have occurred? Unlike the change from Persia to Iran which was
mandated for diplomatic usage by Reza Shah in 1935, there was no official pressure. Why
should it have occurred when it did? In what context should we ask these questions? Urdu is,
after all, in English regularly called Urdu, and always has been. We do not question why hindi is
called Hindi in English. On the other hand, we would not call Greek ellenika. And to call
German Deutsch or French français in an English sentence would raise eyebrows. So
consistency
does not appear to be a factor. Is it perhaps a modern form of orientalism? Persian came into
English in the 18th century as an anglicization of Herodotus' Greek. Why should we change it
now to match the usage of native speakers, when we do not make similar changes for other
languages?
The new usage seems to have appeared during the period when the number of native
English speakers visiting and working in Iran was increasing on a scale for which there may have
been no precedent in any other Middle Eastern or Muslim country. The perpetrators were diverse
and not easy to classify, including various types of professionals and nonprofessionals. Perhaps
1

Earlier, shorter versions of this article, with somewhat different emphases relating more directly to curricular
issues, have been published in Spooner 1992 and 1994.

the movement derived from a sense that farsi suggests some degree of familiarity with an exotic
culture, a cachet. It also connotes the equal value of another cultural community on its own
terms. It is patently modern, perhaps even postmodern. “Persian," on the other hand, may carry
connotations of elitism, romanticism, even Orientalism of an earlier type. It is by implication
dated.
The shift is not, however, without more serious implications. In the case of most
languages which are commonly learned by non-native speakers, the consequences of replacing
the English name of the language with the native name would be no more than stylistic, and
might even suggest increased international significance both for the language and for its speech
community. Unfortunately, calling Persian farsi has the opposite effect. Since Afghanistan and
Tajikistan now use different native terms for the language, the new usage may even be a
symptom of its declining international status, for it reduces it to a local level, making national
political connotations inescapable. In fact, by changing the English name of the language now
we may appear to choose political sides and risk becoming complicit agents of larger changes.
We are, of course, impotent to manage the naming of anything beyond our own small academic
and professional community throughout the English-speaking world. However, by analysing the
processes at work we may learn more about one of our perennial concerns: the dynamic interplay
between language and other dimensions of culture.
In what follows, I have limited objectives. I argue that careful attention to the naming
issue may illuminate some of the darker corners of the policy picture. We must avoid doing
anything that would contribute to the deracination of Persian from its larger cultural and
historical context and legitimate a new status for it as just another national language, albeit of a
country with a population of some seventy million. I am particularly concerned that the change
invalidates much of the justification we have for insisting that the place of Persian as a supranational literary language (because of its administrative and literary role in Asia over the past
millenium) should be more secure than, say, Hungarian or Bengali. In brief, if we use “farsi” as
the English name of the language, the role of Persian as one of the main languages of writing in
world history is lost to English speakers (and generally to non-Persian speakers). I shall therefore
first attempt to place the phenomenon in its historical context.
I. Dari, farsi, and tojiki
Persian and farsi are, of course, in origin not different names. They both emerged from
the same political situation some two thousand five hundred years ago. Based on a summer
capital in an area known as Pars in what is now southern Iran, the Achaemenians established an
empire covering most of southwest Asia. As a result of their success the toponym ”pars” lives
on in three related traditions:
(i)

Arabicized in the New Persian name of the province "Fars" in southern Iran, and

(ii)

Arabicized in the name of the language, farsi, and

(iii) Hellenized in the Greek pers- (the Greeks associated the Persians with their mythical
hero Perseus), derivatives of which are still used to denote everything related to the high

culture of Iran (pre-Islamic and Islamic) in Western languages. The root that gives us Persian
became inseparable from the administrative language of the empire and the homeland of the
Achaemenians in southern Iran. Persian (the language) and farsi are historically reflexes of the
same word. But apart from the fact that Anglicized Greek suits English better than Arabicized
Persian, local connotations and usages of the latter have recently changed in some respects (as a
result of modern nationalism) that are irrelevant to our generally more academic concerns, as
characterized in the former.
After the Achaemenians, the Persian language evolved under the succeeding empires
(Seleucids 312 - 250, Parthians 250 BC - 226 AD, Sasanians 226 - 651), losing its inflections (as
Hellenistic Greek did over the same period), and reemerged in its modern form after the Arab
conquest, since when it has changed so slowly that texts from over a thousand years ago are as
readable to modern Persian-speakers, of any country, as Shakespeare is to modern Englishspeakers. In the first ten centuries of the Islamic period it spread over an even larger area
extending into the Tarim Basin (modern Xinjiang) in the east and the Deccan plateau of
peninsular India in the south. Most of this vast area came to be dominated by Persian-speaking
Muslim ruling classes of what may be called (after Hodgson 1974) “Persianate" culture, a culture
that was associated since the Achaemenians with the idea of Iran (cognate with our “Aryan”),
which became a local modern identity only with the rise of nationalism in the region beginning
in the 19th century. The language inevitably served not only as the language of government and
bureaucracy but of all the functions of court (i.e. Government) life, of which perhaps the most
significant in the long term has been a monopoly on all genres of literary production, familiarity
with which became the core of Persianate identity. Once established in these roles, Persian
continued to dominate them down to the present century, when finally, long after Persianate
culture began to decline through much of the area, the geopolitical situation began to change
irrevocably. This change, when it finally came, was not as might at first be surmised, the result
of the intrusion of foreign powers, but rather of their departure.
For a thousand years, therefore, Persian enjoyed cultural preeminence over a large
proportion of central, western, and southern Asia. This area is roughly equivalent to what Le
Strange (1905) called the “Eastern Caliphate." But the direct influence of Persian even today
extends beyond the Eastern Caliphate proper, most obviously into the lives of the Hindus of
South Asia, whose modern languages are replete with Persian loan words and calques. The
everyday language of local communities throughout this vast area was
(a) a variety of dialects of Persian,
(b) a variety of other Iranian languages. The relatively well-known Balochi, Kurdish,
Ossetic, Pashto, Yaghnabi, though still important, have not developed a standard form. A
large number of smaller languages remain undescribed. Many others have disappeared in
recent centuries.
(c) a variety of Indo-Aryan languages and dialects
(d) a variety of Turkic vernaculars.

For about the same length of time, since the beginning of the movement of Turkic peoples into
southwest Asia, Turkic has spread at the expense of both Persian and other Iranian languages for
purposes of everyday communication between non-literate speakers of different languages—that
is, as a local or regional lingua franca. Over large areas, starting in Azarbaijan and spreading
east, Turkic eventually eclipsed many minor, localized Iranian languages. But Persian was the
principle language of writing, and continued to function as the overall koine for any public
interaction related to the written record, whether administrative or literary. As much as half of
the population of modern Iran now speaks a form of Western Turkic for domestic or other
purposes, but all literacy (with only minor exceptions) and (secular) education continue to be in
Persian. Even after the growth in this century of literacy and official use of languages other than
Persian, mostly in the parts of the region that came under colonial administrations, where it
suited Russian policy in the North and British policy in India to encourage Turkic and Urdu
respectively, Persian continued to be important as a second language for the intelligentsia and in
the educational system. It is not entirely coincidental that Persian ceased to be required in
schools in India and Pakistan at about the same time (early 1960s) as Latin ceased to be a
requirement for entry to Oxford and Cambridge. It is now suppressed in modern Hindi, though
still evident, as in modern Turkish, and even modern Greek.
Despite enormous diversity and periodic upheaval at the level of community life, the
history of this vast area throughout the two and a half millennia from Cyrus to Khomeini
displays an remarkable degree of continuity and homogeneity in literate or high culture. It is
perhaps not surprising, therefore, that farsi continued as the Persian name of the language
throughout the area to the present day. The continuing use of the term “English" by Americans
and others comes to mind as an analogous continuity, though with a much shorter history.
The future, however, appears less assured. Political, social, and economic changes over
an area much larger than the modern state of Iran, and extending into the global Iranian diaspora
that has developed since the 1979 revolution in Iran, are reflected in a changing awareness of the
language that has for so long been a symbol and focus of Iranian identity. Here and there
particular speakers or groups make various efforts to conserve or to change the language and
attitudes toward it. Between the 1930s and the 1960s several efforts were made to romanize the
Persian script, but without impact. In the Islamic period this language-and-literature-based
identity was until recently also largely an attribute of class. The current rise of a new selfconsciousness among all Persian speakers perhaps can be explained only in the context of similar
intensification of linguistic and ethnic community identities throughout the world.
Such changes in the way speakers relate to unity and diversity in their language are, of
course, not uncommon in recent history. Common speech is often seen as a reflection or even a
condition of common heritage or of common interests, and lack of it (however broadly or
narrowly defined) as a clincher of cultural difference, though it may perhaps just as often be
ignored. Much has been published in recent decades about the language policies of colonial
powers and about linguistic nationalism. This work is not irrelevant to the continuing
uncertainties in the politics of Iran and its neighbors. But the effective context of the continuing
history of Persian includes a number of other factors.

Despite the continuing use of the term “farsi” even now throughout the area, some
regional variation has been officially recognized. Although this recognition has been at the
government level, it is not entirely without popular support. Persian was renamed “tojiki" in the
Soviet Republic of Tajikistan (and, by extension, in the Persian-speaking communities of the
neighboring Soviet republics and through the Soviet Union) in 1928. The Soviet authorities
changed not only the name of the language but also the alphabet. They first changed it to Roman;
by discontinuing education in the Perso-Arabic script they effectively restricted access to
materials printed in Persian outside Soviet territory. This change also broke the most basic
connection with the Islamic world by separating the script of general literacy from the script of
the text of the Qur’an. Later, in 1940, the alphabet was changed to a modified Cyrillic, thus
reinforcing the political relationship with Russia and the other Soviet republics (which
underwent the same change at about the same time as part of a rebirth under Stalin of the
Russification policy of the Czars).
The change of alphabet was an interesting experiment. It had long been advocated by
Westernizers as a means to increase literacy. For this reason it was attempted first in Azerbaijan
in 1922, and effected with success and to some foreign acclaim outside the Soviet union in
Turkey in 1928. There is, however, still no reliable evidence to recommend it as a method of
increasing literacy. Literacy has risen significantly since the 1960s not only in Turkey and in the
Soviet republics, which changed their alphabets, but also and perhaps to a greater extent in Iran,
which retained its modified version of the Arabic script. Perhaps no two languages are exactly
comparable in the functionality of their alphabets, but the countries with the highest literacy rates
in the world include Thailand and South Korea, whose alphabets would not be likely to rank very
high on an international scale of functionality or simplicity. Although Persian in the PersoArabic alphabet is written phonetically, spelling is complicated by a number of factors: there are
several phonetically redundant letters, short vowels are normally not represented, and most
diphthongs are not distinguished. Moreover, in the Perso-Arabic alphabet, at least until very
recently, only the standard literary language was ever written, never any vernacular (cf. the case
of historical Chinese).
When Cyrillic was adapted for use in writing Persian, it was designed not only to be
completely phonetic but also to represent the language as spoken by the Central Asian
intelligentsia. Differences that marked the speaker as coming from a particular area immediately
and for the first time became differences of spelling and standard vocabulary and syntax. Even
the name of the language changed: tajiki in Perso-Arabic became tojiki in the modified Cyrillic.
Persian in Tajikistan was thus cut adrift from the standard form of the language, and the scene
was set for local divergence from the international “classical" standard (which had been
maintained by inter-city correspondence in the absence of any central authority for a thousand
years) through convergence not only with rural dialects of the area (under the influence of Soviet
populism) but also with other Iranian languages, and most significantly with Eastern Turkic,
especially Uzbek. The process accelerated in the following generation, which now constitutes the
senior cohort of the Tajik intelligentsia, who were socialized in an environment of Soviet rather
than Islamic-Persianate literacy. Nevertheless, six decades of isolation behind the Soviet border
appear not to have been sufficient to break the ties of language and culture inherent in the
common use of Persian, and the status difference between farsi, the international standard, and
tojiki (despite its recent standardization) though not as abrupt as before, has not disappeared.

Now as the Tajiks become aware of the significance of their unexpected independence
and renew relations with their Persophone neighbors, they are faced with a new dilemma. Should
they keep the Cyrillic alphabet, in which they were educated (either in tojiki or, in the case of
many of the intelligentsia, in Russian), or switch back to the Perso-Arabic? To stay with Cyrillic
would defeat their purpose of rejoining their historical community, the only community fully
open to them. But if they switch and the neighboring post-Soviet Islamic republics do not, they
will have cut themselves off from the tojiki speakers of Samarqand and Bokhara, and the rest of
Central Asia, the closest members of their pre-Soviet historical community. There are no reliable
census figures for these other Central Asian Persian speakers, but they could easily exceed the
number of native Persian speakers in Tajikistan. Tajikistan did, in fact, legislate an official
change back to Arabic in 1989, but legislation is easier than implementation (cf. Perry 1996,
1997, and 1999).
Thirty years after the Soviets changed the alphabet in Tajikistan, Afghanistan confronted
a similar problem due to the rise of Iranian cultural and political influence in the region. In the
modernizing governments that ruled Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in the 1920s—under King
Amanullah, Reza Shah, and President Ataturk respectively—only Ataturk was ready (and able)
to disregard Islamic sensibilities and break the relationship between literacy and Islam by
changing the script. In Afghanistan the main concern was to reduce the cultural power of Iran.
For this reason in the new constitution of 1964 Afghanistan changed the name of the language as
used in Afghanistan to dari.2 This relatively minor change was sufficient to give rein to
nationalists who wished to introduce elements of vernacular usage into the written language,
making it divergent from the politically dominant form of Persian emanating from Iranian
nationalism. Dari, which signifies “the language of the court" (as distinct from farsi, which
signifies “the language of the province Fars in Iran"), had been available as an alternative to farsi
as the name of the language since the earliest times. New Persian had emerged from Middle
Persian as the language of the local courts that began in the 9th century to take back power from
the Caliphs in Baghdad, less than two hundred years after the Arab-Islamic conquest. Just as
everyday educated Persian speech in Tajikistan had been influenced by Uzbek and by other rural
languages and dialects, and later by Russian, in Afghanistan it was influenced by Pashto (the
“national" language, though not the language of the national bureaucracy) and by Urdu.
Although literacy in Pashto was still negligible at the time and still lags far behind Persian within
Afghanistan, a number of institutions were given Pashto names to be used irrespective of
language, such as “pohantun" for university (after Iran had introduced the Persian-based
daneshgah), making official dari immediately divergent from Iranian farsi, in ways very similar
to the divergence between Indian Hindi and Pakistani Urdu after Partition. By choosing the name
dari Afghans implied that their Persian was the true Persian, and therefore superior to the farsi of
the Iranians. In this connection it is worth remembering that New Persian emerged after the Arab
conquest in what is now Afghanistan, and in the second half of the 18th century (before the era of
modern nation-states in the region) the Afghan Empire was larger than the Iranian.

2

In this connection it is interesting to remember that in the tug-of-war that has emerged between Persian and Pashto
over the past hundred years the Pashtuns raised their own language, Pashto, to official status, nominally equal to
Persian, when Afghans needed to distinguish themselves nationalistically from the Iranians. Cf. Nawid, this volume.

The standard Persian of Iran has, of course, similarly been influenced by local linguistic
factors. Historical convergence on the local level has produced divergence from the standard
literary new Persian of the mediaeval period. It would, in fact, not be easy to determine
objectively which modern form of Persian has diverged least from the mediaeval standard. The
main differences lie in certain verb forms (most of which are periphrastic), in choice of loan
words, and in the adoption of a number of neologisms generated by an academy. However, partly
because Afghans, Iranians, and Tajiks (among others) all rightly claim Persian as their heritage,
and partly because their separation into different language communities is recent and incomplete,
for educated speakers there continues to be no problem of mutual intelligibility. Persian
continues to be the main language for all public purposes not only in Iran but also in
Afghanistan, which (with Tajikistan where the role is shared with Russian) have a combined
population approaching a hundred million, as well as being the domestic or community language
of millions more in the other Central Asian republics, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf (and an
international diaspora). Moreover, beyond these primary communities and although largely
forgotten, it continues (like Latin in the West) to play an important role in vocabulary and wordbuilding in the other languages of the area (comparable to the continuing use of Greek and Latin
in English). Throughout, it continues to be known informally and locally as farsi.
To summarize, apart from the colonial language policies of the past and local
nationalistic sentiments today, the idea of a separate identity in dari and tojiki continues to have
limited significance for native speakers. Those who emphasize them have more concern for
national cultural equality than for linguistic form (if only because as separate standards they are
inadequately described and the amount of scholarship—international as well as local—relating to
them is of little significance). Whatever the future may hold for Persian in Central and Southwest
Asia, Persian speakers today still identify with a single language community. Beyond this
cultural core Persian continues to enjoy a high cultural value among the large number of people
who speak, read, and write it as a second or third language.
II. Persian I and Persian II
Outside Iran, “Persia" remained the Western name for the Iranian polity from the time of
Herodotus until the Iranian government requested the use of “Iran" in diplomatic correspondence
in 1935. Shortly before the 1979 revolution official usage was once again made optional (in view
perhaps of the public relations value not only of the connotations of “Persia" in European
languages but also of a more categorical differentiation from Iraq). But the separation of the
name of the country (Iran) from the name of the language (Persian) for a full generation had
already had its effect in the popular mind and made easier the introduction of farsi to English
usage. Persian is now generally known only as the national language of Iran and might therefore
just as well (it may be argued) be called by a distinctive name. Meanwhile, dari and tojiki have
easily acquired in the West the separate identity the Soviet and Afghan governments had sought
for them.
Much else has changed that was beyond the control of governments, as part of the general
shift in relations between the countries in the area and between these countries and the Western
world. After the severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States in 1979,

academic enrollments in Persian in American universities decreased significantly (similar to the
case of Chinese after 1949). There is also a significant change in the objectives of students who
enroll. The establishment in America of a major branch of the Iranian post-revolutionary
diaspora—one of the most highly educated of its type—has generated a new type of student,
pursuing cultural heritage within the American liberal-arts framework—an option not readily
available to immigrants from, for example, Vietnam or the Philippines! University programs that
were designed to train students for doctoral research in history and literature have more and more
been called on to cater to the interests of ‘heritage language’ students with essentially nonacademic objectives. Since university curricula are now largely enrollment-driven, these interests
must be accommodated.
This accommodation cannot but influence the way we teach. We are obliged to reevaluate
our programs and their relationship to the rest of the curriculum. We find, for example, that for
most purposes, a Persian language course is now measured in simple functional terms against
courses in other “less commonly taught" languages (LCTLs), not (as was the case until the early
1980s) in terms of its success as an introduction to one of the world's great literatures, which
represented a major episode of world civilization as well as the living heritage of several Asian
countries and the basis of educated speech and literacy for a hundred million people. Lack of
awareness of what might be called the changing academic ecology of Persian has led us to react
defensively against the type of demands that are made of LCTL instructors in general, that
Persian should be taught primarily as a spoken language of everyday life, according to the
informal pronunciation of the capital, Tehran.
The University of Pennsylvania has been teaching Persian intermittently since the early
part of the last century and continuously since 1949. But until the 1970s it was taught as a
classical language only—the language of one of the world's richest literary traditions, dating
from the tenth century and still vital today as the basis of public interaction, with no break in
continuity. It was in this form, after all, that it continued to be important also as a professional
language among native speakers of other languages in the region. Persian had entered the
Western curriculum in the first place not because it was the national language of Iran, but
because it had been an international language of educated speech and writing throughout a large
part of the civilized world, comparable to Hellenistic Greek, the original koine, which
predominated in similar functions over an overlapping area a millennium or so earlier. Persian
has now for some time been taught in all the major Middle East programs in the United States,
but as a modern rather than a classical language. Academic attitudes toward it have changed as a
result not only of the emergence of Iran as a major regional power in the 1960s but also because
of changes in academic priorities and in the criteria (never entirely explicit) for the inclusion of
particular languages in the curriculum. Few now are aware that the earliest Western students of
Persian had studied it in the 18th century as the bureaucratic and classical language of Mughal
India. Official interest in the language grew because of its importance beyond the “North West
Frontier" (though within India its importance was declining, and it was replaced with Urdu for
official purposes in 1835-7). Interest faded following the independence and partition of India in
1947. Now most prospective students associate Persian almost exclusively with modern life in
Iran and study it because of Iran's role in the Middle East. There is at least one case of an
experienced Persian instructor being considered ineligible for promotion because of an Afghan
accent—in a major American university.

Changing attitudes towards Persian in the West are related to changes on the ground in
the region, and the relationship works both ways. Since the early 1970s at Penn and elsewhere,
the teaching of Persian as it is used for everyday public purposes in modern Tehran has gradually
diverged from the teaching of the classical form of the language. In most cases students now are
introduced to Persian first as the standard language of modern Iran, only secondarily in its
classical form, and rarely at all in its other standard national forms—of Afghanistan and
Tajikistan—let alone the non-standard forms still in use in considerable populations scattered
(somewhat unevenly) throughout the region. This divergent and narrowing specialization of
Persian instruction has resulted partly from the pressures of funding agencies, which have sought
to promote social science studies and country-oriented research at the expense of literature and
region-oriented research in area-studies programs, and partly also from a diversification of
academic, professional, and other interests among students. But the divergence has confused
rather than clarified the situation, because it is usually not explicit, it is by no means complete,
and it is more evident in some institutions than others.
There is also inconsistent classification of the language in terms of difficulty for English
speakers. It is important to note that Persian (when taught as the modern language of Iran) is
relatively easy to begin with, because some of the basic vocabulary is cognate with English and
the syntax is similar. Beyond the initial hurdle of a strange alphabet, the student finds relatively
simple sentences with familiar structures. Partly for this reason introductory Persian classes are
often relatively large. However, few students progress far into the intermediate level because of
the increasing need to deal with vocabulary, syntax, and usage that are culturally alien to English
speakers as a result of the high degree of convergence with the major non-Indo-European
languages in the region, Arabic and Turkish, as well as the importance of imported Arabic
vocabulary. Enrollments in Persian (when taken for essentially nonacademic, but now common,
purposes) tend to fall off sharply after the first year, further endangering its future in the
curriculum.
We are left with a dilemma. Persian has at best an uncertain future in Western
universities. If it is seen as the national language of Iran, with little to distinguish it from other
less-commonly-taught languages in the eyes of the average administration, its best chance for
survival is probably along the lines of Armenian, supported by an expatriate community with ties
to a home country. In the long term it is unlikely to attract more than the occasional student of
non-Iranian background. But there is little evidence so far to suggest that the Iranian expatriate
community, despite its size and its resources, would support Iranian studies as strongly as the
Armenian community supports Armenian. This process will weaken the status of Persian outside
Iran.
III. Policy Implications
Decisions about language policy in Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan in particular, but also
to some extent in the region in general are made in the shadow of the heritage of a millennium in
which Persian was the principal, if not the only written language. (Arabic was little used outside
the madrasa, where Persian was also used.) This shadow plays differently in different countries
today because of the local nationalistic relations that have evolved between them over the past
century. Iran can only gain from international acceptance of Persian as one of the major

languages of world literacy. The other countries face a dilemma: if their language is the same as
Iran's they lose their major defense against what they identify as Iranian cultural imperialism. By
using a different name for their modern version of Persian and allowing it to diverge as a result
of separation from the longstanding textual tradition of the region (which is now associated
primarily with Iran), they gain socio-political reinforcement for their local nationalism, but they
weaken their claim to its historical base. The spread of modern education favors the political
process and reduces the value of the textual tradition. The division of Persian in the Western
curriculum into dari, farsi and tajiki is similarly related to a shift of academic interest from the
textual tradition to political realities.
The die is probably already cast, though much depends on regional politics over the
coming generation. To break out of this track it would be necessary not simply to make the
negative case: that Persian should be broken into three national languages to be categorized as
LCTLs and programmed in the curriculum according to modern standard methods, if at all.
Rather, a major investment in the construction of a positive case is required, perhaps through
UNESCO channels: that Persian be recognized along with a very few other languages at the level
of international cultural heritage—as a language whose native speakers are outnumbered by
those who use it to varying degrees for a range of purposes, including professional and research
purposes, as a second or third language because of the literature for which it became a vehicle
over the past millennium. Such a category of languages would include English and French in the
Western world and Chinese in Asia. (There would of course be other candidates.) Categorized in
this way it would be easier both for the countries concerned to build positively on their shared
linguistic heritage, and to maintain a place for Persian (inclusive of Dari, Farsi and Tajiki) in the
Western or international curriculum. The academic appeal of Persian would be increased and less
dependent on the vagaries of international politics. Instruction in it could once again be
integrated into a larger program of courses on the history and cultural products for which it is the
key, for a liberal-arts curriculum, rather than being ghettoized with other LCTLs, as a skill.
In the meantime we should choose our terms carefully, and avoid using terms that could
bring the force of Western hegemony behind the process of (non-Western) linguistic divergence.
If we leave no doubt that what we are teaching is Persian, in the larger or inclusive sense, we can
continue to claim that we are teaching not only the major language of Afghanistan, Iran and
Tajikistan (as English programs teach the English of America, Anglo-phone Africa, Australasia,
South Asia, the U.K., etc.), but also an historically important international language that
continues to play an important role in vocabulary building in other historically related languages.
Spanish provides a similar case. If some of us say we teach farsi, we risk being overtaken for
good by the “national language" image with the implication that what we teach is no more or less
important (or loved) than the modern nation-state of Iran. The ”farsi" image will sweep us along
in the direction mapped out by the Soviet colonial ideology and the linguistic nationalisms it has
left behind, besides implicating us in the more dubious crime of unnecessarily inventing English
words. Those of us who are native speakers to boot might perhaps also be accused of linguistic
imperialism. But more significantly, by disguising the international and historical significance of
the language by using the term farsi in situations where it is not necessary to distinguish
particular details of modern usage in different countries, we not only damage our case for
keeping Persian and its literature in the liberal-arts curriculum, but we also lend the weight of the

international curriculum to linguistic divergence in Central Asia. As a result the status of Persian
outside Iran is likely to be reduced.
In either case, if we continue to emphasize modern usage in language studies, we have a
serious problem. We have to organize our teaching around the standard usage of a particular
community of native speakers. Which “standard" Persian pronunciation and usage are we to
work with in this multi-national, multi-cultural age? dari? farsi? ortojiki? If we take the position
that we are working with Persian, the historical international language, in full consciousness of
all the implications, we have an excellent case for defining our own role in the changing modern
curriculum and reclaiming the status that Persian used to hold in it, making us immune to the
pressures that have recently put us on the defensive. However, maintaining this position will
require strong leadership, because it puts us at odds with the professional community of modern
language teachers that has emerged over the past generation, who are native speakers of one
variety of the language. Meanwhile, language policy in Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and other
countries of western and south Asia are torn between the historical forces of identity that depend
on the cultural value of classical Persian poetry and the modern forces of ethnicity and
nationalism that demand ethno-linguistic integrity.
Since the Islamic Republic of Iran is the largest modern community of Persian speakers,
this discussion would not be complete without some attention to the Iranian point of view,
specifically a review of what has been done in Iran over the past few generations by languageconscious Iranians both in and out of government to promote the modern value of the language
that is their treasured heritage and the major historical thread in their cultural and modern
political identity (cf. the powerful case made in Meskoob 1992). The process of nationalization
of the language began in the colonial period. Neither Iran nor Afghanistan were actually taken
over by a Western imperial power. But the British interest in India’s northwestern approaches
and their concern with Russian imperial expansion and European intrigue were the major factors
leading to the definition, organized by the British, of an internationally recognised border
between Afghanistan and Iran guaranteeing them both the status of modern nation-states (cf.
Goldsmid 1876, McLachlan 1994).
Although the major historical cities of the Persianate world have been distributed fairly
evenly throughout the territory that is now divided among Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran,
the history of the last three centuries has left modern Iran with the largest claim to represent the
achievements of the past. How did this happen? The first half of the 18th century was a period of
general decline and disintegration in south, central and southwest Asia. Then the major cities of
Central Asia (Bokhara, Khwarazm, Marv, Samarqand) were cut off from the larger Persianate
world by Russian expansion, a partition of the Islamic world that was later reinforced by the
Soviet Government. The founding of Afghanistan in 1747 was achieved in basically the same
way as all the earlier cases of Islamic history (a process that was immortalized by ibn Khaldun
four centuries earlier), but from a city (Qandahar) that had not previously been a Persianate
capital. So Afghanistan, which had been at the geographical center of the citied Persianate world
was built not on citied23"/> heritage of the Persianate world, but on the tribal heritage of its
geographical interstices. Although the historical cities of Herat, Kabul, Mazar, and Qandahar,
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and even Ghazni, are important players in the history of Afghanistan, their role is in no way
comparable to Isfahan, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz and Tehran, among others, in Iran. Herat,
which was historically perhaps the most significant of Afghanistan’s cities, suffered in the 19th
century first from dynastic conflict inside it, and later conflict over it with Iran. Ghazni, which
was one of the early political centers of the Persianate world in the 11th century, has never risen
back to urban significance. But while Afghanistan became a tribal polity with an urban
periphery, Iran was built on a citied core with a tribal periphery. The early rulers of Afghanistan
hired a Persianate bureaucracy, but they never integrated with the tribal elite. Iran therefore by
the historical accident of urban continuity represents has greater claim to the heritage of the
Achaemenians and the Sasanians in the modern world.
Iran’s claim is strengthened by the city of Isfahan and the Safavids, and the
distinctiveness in the modern world of their Shi’ite Safavid heritage. But for over half a
millennium, down to the 16th century, Persian had served as the sole language of public
interaction, formal and informal throughout the Persianate world, extending well into China, and
southern India, and even for a time under the Ottomans into the Balkans. During this time it
carried with it a general culture of Islamic urbanity but no association with any particular
political, cultural or religious minority or subcommunity. The rise of the Safavid Empire at the
beginning of the 16th century was to transform this situation—as the largest modern political
community of Persian speakers, the successor state to Safavid Empire (1501-1722),
distinguished from its neighbors as the only state to establish the Twelver Shi`ite interpretation
of Islam.
From the time of the fall of the Sasanian Empire and the Arab conquest (651AD) down to
the rise of the Safavids (1501) Iran was a cultural concept without a location, while Persian was
the language of administration, belles lettres and public life in general, for everyone regardless of
their local vernacular. Shi`ism was more prevalent in some parts of the Islamic world than
others, and was generally associated not with any government (apart from periods of prominence
under the Buyids, 930s-1055 in Mesopotamia and the Iranian Plateau, and the Fatimids, who
followed a different branch of Shi`ism in Egypt and North Africa at roughly the same time) but
with opposition to legitimate Sunni governments. During the Safavid and later the Qajar periods,
partly as a result of the influence of Western ideas and political and economic pressures, the
historical idea of Iran had become associated with a particular empire, an empire that promoted
the Twelver Shi`ite interpretation of Islam. As Iran was transformed into a nation-state (a process
in which Western imperialism was a catalyst), Persian became its national language. The fact
that the new Iran claimed a territory that had been at the heart of the pre-Islamic Persian empires
helped but did not determine this process. Much of what has now become Afghanistan, or
Central Asia or southern Iraq, could claim the same heritage. In the crucial period of the second
half of the 18th century Afghanistan was in fact the stronger polity. But the Afghan polity,
despite the fact that its second shah established a Persianate administration, arose from a
different, non-citied, identity.
Although not understood at the time, the events of this period had the effect of changing
the status of Iran and Persian in relation to other Persianate successor states and their use of
Persian. As a result the modern issue of the relationship between language and ethnic or national
identity emerged and governments began to find the need for policies relating to language use.

The Ottoman Empire had already switched from Persian to a highly Persianate form of
“Ottoman” Turkish, in a gradual process beginning as early 15th century. But if the British
Government in India had not replaced Persian with Urdu in 1835 (and subordinated Urdu to
English), Persian could have become the national language of Pakistan, in continuity with its
heritage as the successor state of the Mughal Empire (1526-1857) and the primacy in its territory
of the Mughal city of Lahore. For discussion of the change from Persian to Urdu in north and
south India see the articles by Aslam Syed and Anwar Moazzam in Spooner and Hanaway (in
press). Afghanistan sought to separate itself from the hegemony of Iran by raising the status of
Pashto, and in 1964 changing its name for Persian from farsi to dari. In the part of Central Asia
north of Afghanistan that came under Russian rule, emphasis shifted to the Turkic vernaculars,
with the exception of the late (1928) Soviet creation of Tajikistan where Persian was continued
as the national language (though 40% of the population spoke Uzbek and a significant number of
the remainder spoke other Iranian languages) but with under a changed name, Tojiki, in the
Cyrillic alphabet. The status of Persian in China changed as a result of similar processes. The
many other local languages and dialects of Iran were now in conflict with the inclusiveness of
modern conceptions of national identity, and their numbers have diminished at an increasing rate
since the 1950s.
IV. Language Policy in Iran
Once Persian had become fully nationalized in Iran, the purity of its identity became as
important as the purity of Iranian national identity, inclusive within and exclusive without its
borders. Language became a matter for government policy in the 1930s. Over the next few
decaces five specific problems came to be addressed:
1. The proportion of Arabic vocabulary that had been adopted in the written language over the
past millennium
2. The modern tendency to adopt loan words from French, and later from English
3. How to create new vocabulary for modern science and technology
4. The rights of ethnolinguistic minorities to publication and education in their own languages
5. How to accommodate the normal processes of language change to issues of language policy.
Underlying all five of these problems was the history of Persian as recounted in this chapter: the
barely conscious assumption that Iranian national identity was based on the linguistic continuity
of the past millennium as represented in the writings of classical authors, and that it must
therefore be managed carefully. Partly for this reason Persian as written continued to change
very slowly through the middle of the 20th century, but has speeded up since the 1970s—a
process accelerated by a significant rise in the rate of literacy, by increased interaction with the
outside world, followed by the social consequences of the revolution.

The first three of the problems enumerated above were dealt with by the establishment of
language academies. The work of these institutions and the linguistic awareness that led up to
them has been interestingly documented and discussed by Perry (1985). Under Reza Shah (19251941) the government had established the first Iranian Academy (Farhangestan) in 1935 with the
mandate to coin new words that would keep the language abreast of new developments in the
world of science and technology. However, the Academy’s tasks also included responsibilities
for gathering the language’s historical vocabulary, and formulating its grammar, as well as
investigating the issue of script or alphabet reform. Insofar as it is related in some way to issues
of orthography the historical development of modern nationalistic language awareness among
Iran’s elite is usefully documented by Hashabeiky (2005, especially chapter 4, pp. 73-124). She
reviews discussions of the relationship between Persian and its script from the middle of the 19th
century onwards, following the introduction of printing and the expansion of interaction with
Europe. News of the initiation of the tanzimat period in the neighboring Ottoman Empire (18391876) may also have been a factor, on top of the loss of territory to Russia in the Caucasus (by
the Treaties of Golestan in 1813 and Turkmanchay in 1828). The tension between Westernizing
intellectuals, many of whom lived abroad, and an Islamizing and nationalistic majority in Iran,
which continues today, became significant in the second half of the 19th century. Alphabet
reform was considered by many to be a contributing factor to under-development and a sense of
national inadequacy in a West-dominated world. But nothing was done about it at the level of
government, until the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), and his son, Mohammad Reza (19411979). The Society for Alphabet Reform was founded in Tehran in 1945. But interest in
Romanizing the script seems to have reached a peak in the 1950s. The first Academy achieved
little, was inactive for much of the time and finally closed in 1953. It was not reopened until
1970, by which time nationalist concerns about alien vocabulary had shifted from Arabic and
French to English (cf. Jazayeri 1958), and interest in Romanization (which had been inspired by
Ataturk’s example in 1928) had lost its appeal. The work of the second academy was cut off by
the events of 1979, and it was not until 1990 that a similar body was again opened, this time with
the title of Academy of Persian Language and Literature.
With regard to the fourth question, opposition to the hegemony and monopoly of Persian
within Iran was slow to emerge. There were signs of pressure to allow publication in Azari in the
1960s. For a few years starting in the late 1960s the satyrical weekly tawfiq got away with
publishing columns in street Turki and street Arabic, presumably because it appeared to make
fun of them. However, publication was not permitted in any of the other major minority
languages, such as Balochi, Kurdish, Turkmeni.4 This practice was, however, stopped by the mid
1970s. Public use of these languages was restricted to brief radio programs, mainly national
news.
Since the Revolution in 1979 Iran is no less nationalistic, but it effuses a new linguistic
self-confidence. Several factors may have contributed to this change. The dramatic increase in
literacy rates that began with work of the Literacy Corps as part of the White Revolution in 1963
resulted during the 1970s, the period leading up to the Revolution, in a sea change in the
historical relationship between the written and spoken language. It was no longer possible for a
small elite to control the country through control of the written language—the medium of
administration, and national culture and identity. Ordinary people with standard basic education
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now shared the benefits of access to the written language. After the Revolution the class that was
as comfortable in French or English, and would rarely talk in Persian with a foreigner, had
moved abroad. A new class had become literate and moved into the national elite. Even though
Western doctorates were not uncommon among them, they saw no reason not to speak Persian,
and they were less concerned to suppress the use of minority languages. Now publication in
Azari and Kurdish is common (see http://kurdistantoday.ir/NewsDetail.aspx?itemid=1683),
though these languages do not compete with Persian to any significant degree, and education
remains entirely Persian-medium.
All policy issues in Iran now are influenced both by general processes of globalization
and by particular Western attempts to influence. Since the U. S. is now funding Azari
broadcasting specifically for Iranian Azari-speakers (see
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav031008a.shtml) the situation may
change again. However, the high literacy rate (irrespective of social class or higher education)
and general access to international media make it unlikely that government policy will be able to
control language effectively any more in the long term. The rate of change in everyday language
usage has picked up, the proportion of Arabic loanwords appears to be decreasing, and the
written language is no longer entirely controlled by the models of the classical period. The loss
of these classical models in which the models for public behavior were also embedded (known as
adab) is also seen in the process of cultural change. Now that a population of seventy million has
equal access to information and the formation of public opinion, new forms of competition,
political voice and public behavior are beginning to appear which would have horrified an earlier
generation.

APPENDIX
Is Persian diglossic?
Some readers may wonder why the term diglossia does not appear in this chapter, given
the space devoted to it in the Introduction, and the use C. A. Ferguson made of Persian in his
initial definition of diglossia (1959:325). In the formative period of modern language studies,
when the textual study of a small number of individual languages (philology) gave ground to the
study of language in general throughout the world (linguistics), the concept of diglossia was an
important contribution to the effort to find patterns in language use that would facilitate
comparative studies and the development of theory. Many elements of Persian language usage fit
the diglossia pattern. However, by simply dropping Persian into the diglossia basket we would
distract attention from a number of other elements that distinguish it from that pattern. Ferguson
begins his article by introducing the idea of diglossia as “the use of two or more varieties of the
same language” in a single speech community. He then uses Persian (along with Italian) as a
prime example of a situation of “perhaps the most familiar” type of diglossia: in which there is a
“standard language and regional dialect … where many speakers speak their local dialect at
home or among family or friends of the same dialect area but use the standard language in
communicating with speakers of other dialects or on public occasions.” (He does not give
sources, and he makes no reference anywhere in his article to the work of scholars who
specialized at that time in the study of Persian. However, an earlier article of his (1957) suggests

that he used native speakers who were students at Harvard as informants.) In the same opening
paragraph he offers other different examples, and compares the whole phenomenon to the
process of language standardization in Germany and France. The article then elaborates his
definition by means of a comparative review of the cases of Arabic, Modern Greek, Swiss
German, and Haitian Creole. The history of each of these languages, and their diglossic
divergence is of course different, as he freely admits. The question here is what would be gained
or lost from including Persian in the same catalogue as just another variety of diglossia. The
answer to this question is relative, rather than black and white, but is relegated here to an
appendix in order to avoid confusion with the argument about language policy.
The concept of diglossia in its broadest sense might be expected to include Persian. But
this would leave open the question of whether that would be analytically useful. In its broadest
sense diglossia could include even English, or in fact any language with an established tradition
of literacy, since every written language develops over time according to a different dynamic
from speech. Ferguson’s references to Persian, both in the diglossia article (1959) and elsewhere
appear to take no account of the larger context of Persian usage, historical and modern, but rather
to treat it as comparable to Italian (ibid.), viz. simply the language of a single modern national
community. This treatment omits a number of significant features. Dropping Persian in the
diglossia basket leads the non-specialist to misunderstand a number of factors that make it very
different from most of the other languages in that basket, and does nothing to improve our
understanding of modern Persian usage. The point of this brief appendix is to describe what
distinguishes Persian from the typical diglossic language, and explain why it has evolved
differently.
Ferguson was writing in the 1950s, when the literacy rate in Iran was very low (perhaps
30%). Following the development of a Literacy Corps in 1963 (after the model of the U.S. Peace
Corps), which provided teachers for village schools throughout the country, within a decade or
so the literacy rate rose spectacularly. It is now between 80 and 90%, possibly the highest of all
countries using the Arabic script. The importance of these figures lies in what they show about
the rate and quality of change in the relationship between written and spoken language over the
past half-century. If literacy is a major factor in diglossia, then the nature of diglossia in Iran has
changed out of recognition in not much more than a single generation, to the point where if it
fitted the situation in the 1950s it would have to be completely redefined for use today.
Attention to the historical situation introduces further complications. The history of
Persian continues to be significant in modern usage. As in other parts of the world Iranians today
live under the cultural shadow of the past. The past still conditions the present in modern
Western societies where history is losing its place in the curriculum. The Islamic World, and Iran
in particular, continues to be historically aware, for reasons that are both Islamic and
nationalistic.
As we have reviewed already, modern Persian has had a continuous history since its reemergence in the routinization of political life that followed the Arab conquest of West and
Central Asia in the 7th century. During the following centuries it spread fast despite the fact that
the lands that had earlier been under Persian rule now looked towards Baghdad and an Arabic
speaking Caliph as the symbolic center of the new order. In the 13th century, however, the

Mongols arrived from the East, put an end to the symbolic center in Baghdad and established an
empire that stretched from Western Asia into China. Mongol administration became the vehicle
for the further expansion of Persian—across Asia into China, into later into southeastern Europe
and South Asia.
What English has been for global communication in the 20th century, Persian was in the
high Middle Ages—the most important language for government, administration,
communication and trade throughout the ecumene. Yes, there was a Latinate world to the west
(but Venician nobles sent their sons to Beirut to learn Persian), and a Sinic world to the east (but
Persian was the language of commerce along trade routes well into central China, cf. Morgan
2011, and is still taught as a language of religious commentary in many Chinese mosques), and
an Arabicate world in Africa (but Persian words found their way into Wolof in modern Senegal).
Moreover, English has for the most part not replaced local languages. Persian, on the other hand,
offered membership in the larger ecumene of civilized life of the time. Those who joined it were
not choosing a high (written) language for a particular purpose and leaving a low (unwritten)
language or languages for less formal purposes. Rather by writing Persian and speaking it (as it
was written) they were participating in activities of larger political, economic and literary
significance, leaving the use of other local languages for interaction with people who operated
only on the local level without awareness of Persianate ecumene.
Persian was the English of the high Middle Ages, when Central Asia was the center of
the world. But its cultural value and its political and economic significance were always
changing. Its use expanded from the 8th to the 13th centuries. It was at its height in the 14th
century. And it began to decline in the 15th, through a creeping process of vernacularization,
comparable to the emergence of the Romance languages at the expense of Latin in Europe. First,
the Ottoman administration switched to a highly Persianized form of Turkish. South Asian
vernaculars began to encroach in the 17th century, first Pashto and Urdu, later Sindhi. The British
in India finally shifted from Persian to a partnership of English and Urdu in 1835. Perhaps the
last government of a non-Persian speaking population to change was the Princely State of
Hyderabad which completed the process in 1884 (cf. Moazzam 2011). The process was
accelerated in the 19th century by the administrative reorganization of Asia, and division of the
Persianate world, under British and Russian imperial rule. Persian had provided the cultural glue
that held together all the local Muslim polities and trade centers from Anatolia to the Yellow
River and from the Aral Sea to the south of India. When this world became divided between two
external non-Muslim empires, Persian lost the function that was its strength. But change in other
dimensions of public life lagged, again in ways that are comparable with Latin in the West.
Persian continued its literary function into the 20th century. It finally disappeared from the school
curriculum in India and Pakistan at roughly the same time as Latin was dropped from the
curriculum in England. But the cultural value of its literature continues to support its
international status.
As the world continued to change in the 19th and early 20th centuries, not only did the use
of language change, but academic attitudes toward the study of language also changed. Although
the relationship between Sanskrit and Greek had been noticed in the 16th century, it was the work
of Sir William Jones in the 18th century (1746-1794) that spurred the first great expansion of
language study to include the textual records of all Indo-European languages. The next

acceleration in the process came with the rise of interest among anthropologists in non-written
languages in the late 19th century. Linguistics emerged as a new field of study only in the 1940s,
with a new focus on the scientific study of language in general, whether written or not. It
gradually incorporated textual studies, as historical linguistics, the textual study of written
languages, which had been known as philology. While this development led very quickly to
spectacular advances in out understanding of language in general, it tended to orphan some types
of historical language study, in particular the historical sociology of literacy. Persian is a very
good, perhaps the best, example of such a victim. It has been particularly unfortunate for Persian
because (unlike, for example, Latin) so little work had been done on it earlier. Persian has been
one of the three most important written languages in world history. It’s vast corpus of literature
continues to be highly valued in the original as well as in translation in a number of countries
besides the three (Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan) which use it under different names (dari, farsi,
tajiki) in forms which differ similarly to the modern English of Australia, England and the U.S.
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